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Indemnification & Insurance

  1. Why You Need to Reconsider Indemnification and Insurance Arrangements
  2. Practice Pointers
  3. Litigation over Compensation Practice Area
  4. Liability Issues Practice Area
  1. Why You Need to Reconsider Indemnification and Insurance Arrangements

    Even though Section 145 of the Delaware General Corporation Law prohibits companies from indemnifying an officer or director unless the person acted in "good faith," Section 145(g) – on the face of it anyways – permits companies to purchase D&O insurance, notwithstanding bad faith. However, in some cases, the D&O coverage might not be sufficient to cover a director’s entire exposure.

    It also should be noted that the SEC recently adopted a policy requiring settling parties to forgo any rights they may have to indemnification or reimbursement by insurers. Phil Koehler of Stradling, Yocca, Carlson & Rauth LLP notes that once upon a time, boards looked upon indemnification agreements – the ones that protect the CEO and other executive officers against shareholder litigation and provided for the advancement of their defense costs - as essential tools in the company's struggle to recruit and retain the best and the brightest management talent. 

    Alas, yet another cherished bit of corporate governance folklore is laid waste by the law of unintended consequences.  Last year the SEC concluded a contentious accounting fraud investigation of Xerox Corporation. In the end, six former executives coughed up $22 million in penalties and disgorgement payments to the SEC in settlement of claims that they had personally benefited by receiving special bonuses and proceeds from stock sales at a time when they were perpetrating accounting fraud.

    With Xerox's announcement of the settlements came the mystifying revelation that Xerox would indemnify these six rascals. Xerox argued that the terms of the indemnification agreements were "bullet proof" and, therefore, it was compelled to reimburse these officers.

    Of course, the SEC saw this for what it was: a cynical end run around personal responsibility facilitated by a board too focused on the company's contractual obligations to disgraced former executives and too blasé about its fiduciary duties to shareholders. SEC Chairman, William Donaldson commented:

    "[T]he fight against corporate fraud requires resolve in the boardroom and at all levels of government. I'm concerned about companies that, under permissive state laws, indemnify their officers and directors against disgorgement and penalties ordered in law enforcement actions, including those brought by the Commission. In my mind, this isn't good public policy. This is an area we may need to consider ways to bring about reform."

    To avoid a repetition of this, the SEC enforcement staff adopted a policy in which all settlement offers in SEC enforcement actions against officers and directors must be contingent on a representation and warranty that no part of any penalties paid to the SEC are being indemnified by the company or reimbursed by insurance. The SEC is considering whether the policy should apply to disgorgement remedies as well.

    Thus, the "bullet proof" indemnification agreement tumbles from grace as a tool in recruiting and retaining executive officers.  Indemnification agreements that strain the maximum allowable limit under the state law of incorporation are no longer just a "gimme" in negotiating the CEOs employment agreement. 

    The Rite Aid case is another prime example of a wayward CEO with a  bullet proof indemnification agreement that caused the corporation to pay his fines and penalties and, in effect, nullify the punishment for his transgressions against the shareholders.  These are not isolated cases.

    As a result, Compensation Committees should consider scenarios like the Xerox settlements and ensure that they negotiate exclusions and limitations on indemnifiable losses in executive indemnification agreements – including renegotiating existing indemnification agreements – so that shareholders are not left in the position of helplessly watching corporate assets being paid for wayward executives’ fines and penalties – and thus nullify the punishment meted out by the SEC for their transgressions against the company. It would not be surprising to also see courts take the same position in their damage judgments and in approving settlements.

     
  2. Practice Pointers
  3. Litigation over Compensation Practice Area
     
  4. Liability Issues Practice Area

     

     

 

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