The Advisors' Blog

This blog features wisdom from respected compensation consultants and lawyers

Monthly Archives: November 2012

November 13, 2012

Retention Packages in M&A: Troubles with Separating Votes on Deal & Pay

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

Check out this Chicago Tribune article entitled “Analysis: Xstrata investors get pay vote but may not risk stand“:

That could be advice for corporate governance advocates who sought a separate vote on the lavish executive pay deal that was bundled in as part of the terms of the $33 billion merger between Glencore and Xstrata. Thanks to a voting structure shake-up, shareholders will now be able to vote for the deal without the pay, and have an option to reject the proposed retention packages, achieving what looks like a victory against excessive boardroom remuneration.

But as unpopular as the retention packages are, fund managers may prove too worried about threatening the commercial promise of the union – and going against the advice of Xstrata’s board – to risk making a stand.That means at the end of the day, Glencore and Xstrata executives are likely to get both their merger and their pay, while silencing critics who had initially accused them of ramming the deal through without a separate pay vote.

One former Xstrata shareholder, who sold out of his position soon after the Glencore merger talks began, described the awkward dilemma facing shareholders as “appalling”. “There’s nothing wrong with paying executives well if the shareholders are doing well too. But the whole obfuscation that is going on here and across the industry on pay, we are very much against,” the fund manager said, asking not to be identified while discussing an investment decision on a deal that is still up in the air. “The idea that you can be paid a lot before investors have made any money is ridiculous. Retention packages? Why have any of that? Why shouldn’t we just pay people well after they have performed?”

Instead of a single up-or-down vote on a merger including the pay deal, shareholders will now have three votes: to allow the merger if the pay deal is approved, to allow the merger to go ahead without the pay deal, and finally an up-or-down vote on the pay deal itself. That means that when the vote on the pay deal finally takes place, shareholders will know whether their decision would scupper the merger or not. The voting shake-up plays on a division of responsibility at fund houses, whereby separate teams shape views on the logic of the merger and on resolutions linked to governance issues like incentives and bonuses.

“This separation of investment and corporate governance decision-making is a problem that requires addressing,” said Simon Wong, a partner at Governance for Owners, a fund manager that invests on the premise that guarantees of shareholder rights improve long-term returns. “Under the bundled scenario, the corporate governance and investment teams have to work together to reconcile views. Now they can just vote separately, and the likely objections to the retention package and corporate governance will be much less consequential.”

Bundled resolutions are broadly unpopular as they force investors into a binary choice on a complex deal and all its accompanying terms, preventing managers from fully expressing a view on remuneration or corporate governance issues without jeopardizing a deal that on balance makes investment sense. In this case, some investors may accept management’s argument that the future success of the merged group relies on how many of Xstrata’s operational staff remain in their roles.

Unlike in other mergers, there is little overlap in revenue-generating staff between Glencore and Xstrata. Were many Xstrata staff to leave and take their revenue streams with them, that could cost investors more than they gain from curbing pay. Miner Xstrata will be tying its future to trader Glencore at a turning point as it moves from an acquisition-fuelled first decade to a period of organic growth, intended to boost volumes by 50 percent and cut costs.

Among the projects set to come on stream are Koniambo, a challenging greenfield ferronickel mine in New Caledonia, and the Las Bambas copper project in Peru. Investors may conclude that now is no time to risk losing staff. “Investors should make a joined up decision, to say – we may not like the retention packages but on balance, do we need them because these executives are so essential to the merged entity? The way the deal is now structured, means that you can almost divorce the two,” Wong added.

OPPOSITION

With its opaque image and corporate governance record, Glencore’s bid to merge with Xstrata has provoked opposition from institutional owners of the miner at every turn. Some asset managers like Threadneedle and Schroders feel Glencore – Xstrata’s biggest shareholder – is forcing through a deal that fails to reward fellow investors for their long-term support of the miner or for the increased volatility on future returns that a union with Glencore would probably bring.

Xstrata shareholders who have opposed the deal from the outset have had to weigh the merits of speaking out against the union and the risk of inflicting damage to the share price. Even after heated battles on pay at a number of companies this year, in a series of votes that became known among corporate governance advocates as the “shareholder spring”, fund managers proved reluctant to actually vote down pay deals which could spur talented executives to take their skills elsewhere. Data compiled by Legal & General Investment Management showed just six remuneration reports were voted down this year.

If the Xstrata pay deal is rejected and the merger goes ahead without it, there is no clarity on what terms the merged company would then decide offer Xstrata staff. Investors in a merged firm without the pay deal may find they have less clout because votes on pay could be advisory rather than binding. Nigel Read, partner at law firm Hogan Lovells in London, said the voting shake-up was “quite a clever tactical ploy” to make sure that if people are wavering they will vote in line with the advice of the Xstrata independent directors. He thinks investors are now more likely to take that guidance than risk scuppering the deal altogether.

This sort of decoupling may become the prevalent custom, said Read, as management boards seek to retain influence while addressing the concerns of disaffected shareholders. In both bundled and unbundled votes, funds say they are aware how vulnerable they are to manipulation.

While declining to comment directly on the merger while the deal is pending, large Xstrata shareholder Legal & General Investment Management said it has had to weigh similar issues in the past, when pay packages were linked to deals. “There have been some corporate events where the companies have tried to put horrendous pay packages through that have been linked to the corporate action and we’ve had to say yes and sign it off because we want the actual corporate event to happen,” said Angeli Benham, LGIM’s UK Corporate Governance Manager.

November 12, 2012

Say-on-Pay: Now 59 Failures

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

I’ve added one more company to our failed say-on-pay list for 2012 as Oracle failed during the past week with 41% support. We are now at 59 companies in ’12 that have failed to garner major support. Hat tip to Karla Bos of ING Funds for keeping me updated.

November 7, 2012

“Say-on-Pay” Soon in France?

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

Here’s news from the Glass Lewis Blog:

After targeting executive remuneration at state-controlled companies with new regulation introducing pay caps for CEOs, France’s new government is now considering potentially sweeping reforms for all public companies. In a recent consultation paper released by the Finance Ministry (see Glass Lewis’ response), market participants were asked to comment on numerous questions mainly focused on the approval and structure of executive pay. While shareholders at French companies are currently entitled to resolve on equity-based incentives and severance payments, a vote on a company’s pay practices is either recommended by the AFEP-MEDEF Code (the reference corporate governance code for the majority of French issuers) or required by law. However, France could soon enlarge the number of European countries introducing say-on-pay proposals. The consultation inquiry, in fact, seeks comments on whether such mechanism allowing shareholders to voice their concerns over poorly designed pay policies should be envisaged and whether it should be binding or advisory in nature.

Regarding certain components of variable remuneration such as stock options and restricted shares, the French government goes so far as to consider a ban among the possible policy options. Moreover, the introduction of deferral mechanisms and claw-back provisions is considered in the Finance Ministry’s inquiry together with a requirement for French issuers to allow employee representatives to serve on remuneration committees. Interestingly, the consultation paper also raises some preliminary issues over the scope and nature of any new proposed measures, with the debate centering on the choice between binding legal provisions or “comply-or-explain” best practices.

During his presidential campaign Mr. Holland promised to curb excessively generous pay packages with the French government opposing the severance pay for Safran’s CEO and an indemnity pursuant to a non-compete agreement paid to Air France-KLM’s former CEO. The extent to which the government will be successful in forcing changes at companies where it does not hold a controlling or majority stake will be soon clear as the new measures are expected to be announced in the fall.

November 5, 2012

TSR & Management Performance: A Metric Appropriately Used, or Mostly Abused?

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

In our “Pay-for-Performance” Practice Area, I recently posted this article by Roland Burgman and Mark Van Clieaf that “identifies the issues associated with the unconsidered use of TSR as a metric to represent the gains (or otherwise) in shareholder wealth and in contexts such as long-term incentive compensation and proxy voting by shareholders (including “say on pay”). Not all TSR is created equal. Other measures, such as economic profit (EP), return on invested capital (ROIC), and future value (FV), need to be introduced to effectively interpret the quality of TSR. There are not one but eight states of the quality of TSR, and this has implications for effectively evaluating true pay-for-performance alignment and considered say-on-pay voting by institutional investors everywhere.”

November 1, 2012

UBS Seeks to Allay Shareholder Concerns Regarding Pay

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

According to this Glass Lewis blog, UBS is conducting a roadshow – at least with its board chair – to meet with shareholders and get feedback about how to revise its compensation practices…