The Advisors' Blog

You probably saw yesterday’s Wall Street Journal article on the Delaware Chancery’s latest decision related to Elon Musk’s 2018 Tesla pay package. There are very few takeaways for executive compensation professionals in the decision, but it seems worthy of addressing here — even if only for its novelty. So, keeping with the theme of my April post on Tesla’s proxy filing — including the proposal requesting that stockholders ratify said pay package after the Chancery Court ordered it rescinded — here are five things to know about the latest decision:

– This opinion was still at the Chancery Court level — penned by Chancellor McCormick, who was also responsible for the initial post-trial decision ordering rescission of the award. The order addressed the defendants’ motion to “revise” the post-trial opinion based on the stockholder vote and plaintiff attorneys’ petition for fees and expenses.

– Chancellor McCormick used this opportunity to clarify/emphasize a few points from the initial post-trial opinion. Specifically, that the decision did not hold that the Tesla board should have paid Musk nothing. She says, “there were undoubtedly a range of healthy amounts that the Board could have decided to pay Musk. Instead, the Board capitulated to Musk’s terms and then failed to prove that those terms were entirely fair.” She also clarified that none of the legal theories applied in the opinion were novel — if anything was novel in the opinion, it was simply that those legal principles had not previously been applied by the court to Musk vis-a-vis Tesla.

– The opinion considered events post-dating the initial post-trial decision, including the actions of the single-member special committee that was formed to assess the redomestication of Tesla to Texas and whether Musk’s 2018 award should be submitted to a second stockholder vote and the 2024 stockholder vote intended to “ratify” the award.

– Chancellor McCormick found that the “ratification” argument had four fatal defects — three expected, one surprising.

• First, there are no procedural grounds for flipping the outcome of a post-trial decision based on evidence created after trial. Procedural rules allow the court to reopen the trial record for newly discovered evidence (“in existence at the time of trial”) but not newly created evidence. From a policy perspective, if this was allowed, “lawsuits would become interminable” and it would “eviscerate the deterrent effect of derivative suits.”

 

• Second, as an affirmative defense, common-law ratification is waived if not timely raised. And, “wherever the outer boundary of non-prejudicial delay lies,” raising the defense “six years after this action was filed, one and a half years after trial, and five months after the Post-Trial Opinion” was too late.

 

• Third, in a conflicted-controller transaction, the “maximum effect” of stockholder ratification is to shift the burden of proving entire fairness; it doesn’t shift the standard of review, which would require MFW’s additional protection of an independent committee and conditioning the transaction on the dual protections before negotiations. Defendants tried to argue that MFW was invoked after the post-trial opinion, to which the opinion says, “One does not ‘MFW‘ a vote, which is part of the MFW protections; one ‘MFW‘s a transaction.”

 

• Finally, the proxy statement contained material misstatements. Tesla went to great lengths to avoid any argument that this second vote was not fully informed — having annexed 10 documents to the proxy, including the opinion and the special committee’s report to the board. But the legal impact of the stockholder ratification was unclear — and, trying to be transparent, the proxy said as much. That was a problem. “To be fully informed for ratification purposes, ‘the stockholders must be told specifically . . . what the binding effect of a favorable vote will be.’”   Plus, the proxy used phrases like “extinguish claims,” “any wrongs … should be cured” and the disclosure deficiencies “corrected,” which were “materially false and misleading.”

 

– Using “sound” methodology, the plaintiff’s attorneys asked for $5.6 billion in freely tradeable Tesla shares as attorney fees. To this, the opinion says, “in a case about excessive compensation, that was a bold ask.” To avoid a windfall and reach a reasonable number, the opinion adopts the defendants’ approach of using the $2.3 billion grant date fair value to value the benefit achieved and applies 15% to that amount, resulting in a (still massive) fee award of $345 million.

– Meredith Ervine