The Advisors' Blog

This blog features wisdom from respected compensation consultants and lawyers

November 19, 2026

One-Time Awards: A Roadmap for Compensation Committees

One of the biggest challenges compensation committees have faced in recent years is structuring their pay to retain top executives. That’s caused more compensation committees to consider, and some to approve, special awards for retention purposes. While say-on-pay results were incredibly strong in 2026, special awards were the most common reason for low support. If a special award is on the table at your company or one of your clients, this HLS blog from the Aon team shares a “five-step roadmap for compensation committees and management teams, from initial design through the say-on-pay vote.” Those steps are:

– Test the Award Before Approval

– Engage Shareholders Early

– Explain the Award at Grant

– Present the Rationale in the Proxy

– Set Expectations and Prepare to Respond

Here’s what the blog says about step 3:

The Form 8-K is often the first public explanation of the award. Item 5.02(e) generally requires a filing within four business days of a material grant or award to an NEO, but an instruction excludes grants materially consistent with the previously disclosed terms of an existing plan or arrangement. Whether a special award falls within that instruction should be determined with counsel. Although Item 5.02(e) requires only a brief description of the arrangement and amounts payable, a company can go further by explaining why the committee made the award, providing an early version of the rationale that will later appear in the proxy statement.

Even where no filing is required, a voluntary Form 8-K allows the company to explain the award’s rationale, performance conditions, and nonrecurring nature at the outset and can facilitate informed shareholder discussions. Because it will serve as a reference point for the CD&A, the Form 8-K and CD&A should be consistent, and companies should consider filing the award agreement with the Form 8-K rather than with the next periodic report.

Step 5 is also about getting ahead of issues and suggests that committees consider early whether and how to respond to a negative proxy advisor recommendation and even to think a step ahead about ways the compensation committee might respond to a low say-on-pay vote.

– Meredith Ervine 

November 18, 2026

Say-on-Pay: Largest Asset Managers Deviate More from Proxy Advisors & One Another

As Liz shared in September, 2026 was a banner year for say-on-pay. One factor potentially driving the increase in support is that the “big five” investors are taking more independent views. Per Pay Governance:

The “big five” investors continue to take a selective approach to opposing S&P 500 SOP proposals and rely heavily on their proprietary voting frameworks. Top asset managers supported SOP at a rate of 95.6% in 2026 and deviated from proxy advisor SOP opposition in an overwhelming majority of cases.

Not everyone thinks this is a good thing. ICCR, together with the Center for Active Stewardship (CAS), recently studied this trend more thoroughly by looking at how the largest asset managers voted on the 27 say-on-pay failures from July 1, 2025, to June 30, 2026 and found that a few of the major asset managers supported a majority of the say-on-pay proposals that failed. From ICCR’s perspective, “If funds support CEO pay when the majority of votes are cast against, it could suggest guidelines are too lenient.”

For the corporate audience, the important takeaway from the ICCR research is that the largest asset managers are increasingly diverging from proxy advisor recommendations and from each other. Understanding where your largest shareholders are in the spectrum can help you plan accordingly. The ICCR blog shares this data on how some of the major U.S. asset managers voted on say-on-pay proposals that ultimately failed:

– Vanguard voted against 8/25 possible SoPs (32% alignment)
– State Street voted against 12/24 possible SoPs (50% alignment)
– BlackRock voted against 16/23 possible SoPs (70% alignment)
– Goldman Sachs voted against 5/24 possible SoPs (21% alignment)
– With 5 votes unknown, Citadel voted against none of the SoPs in the scorecard – indicating 0% alignment with the majority of shareholders

European asset managers and public pension funds, on the other hand, were very aligned with voting outcomes:

– Legal and General (voted against SoP in 22/22 possible votes)
– UBS (voted against 21/21 possible SoP votes)
– Amundi (voted against 16/16 known SoP votes)
– BNP Paribas (voted against 15/15 possible SoP votes)
– HSBC (voted against 13/13 possible SoP votes
– State Board of Administration of Florida System (voted against SoP in 19/19 known votes)
– Teachers Retirement System of Texas (voted against SoP in 16/16 possible votes)
– State of Wisconsin Investment Board (voted against SoP in 16/16 known votes)
– Maryland State Retirement & Pension System (voted against SoP in 15/15 possible votes)
– NY State Teachers’ Retirement System (voted against SoP in 12/12 possible votes)

For more detail, you can check the full scorecard.

– Meredith Ervine 

November 17, 2026

What the Executive Compensation Proposal Says About Timing of Effectiveness

The executive compensation disclosure reform proposal is just a proposal, but I know one of the things on everyone’s minds is when any changes, if adopted, might be effective. This Goodwin blog addresses what the proposal says about the timing of effectiveness:

If adopted, the amendments would become effective on the first January 1 following publication of the adopting release in the Federal Register. Compliance would be required beginning with a company’s first full fiscal year ending on or after that date, and for registration statements and prospectuses initially filed on or after that date that must include financial statements for a fiscal year ending on or after that date.

Notably, companies could comply early if they comply with the amended item in its entirety. We don’t know how long it will take to move from proposing to adopting release (though I think it’s safe to say not in time for the 2027 proxy season for calendar year companies, given that comments on the proposal will likely be due in January), but allowing early compliance (if that stays in any final rule) means companies could take advantage of changes quickly once final.

– Meredith Ervine 

November 16, 2026

The Executive Compensation Proposal, Just in Time to Digest by Thanksgiving!

The SEC approved its long-awaited executive compensation disclosure reform proposal on Friday. Here is the 542-page proposing release, the press release, statements by Chairman Atkins and Commissioner Uyeda and the five-page fact sheet. Beyond the fact sheet, the SEC Staff gave us another summary list of changes that maps current requirements to the proposed amendments on pages 25-28 of the proposing release. Not to give anyone ideas, but if you really like the proposed changes and want to confuse and annoy any relatives who insist you go around the table saying what you’re thankful for during Thanksgiving dinner, this list might fit the bill.

As Liz explained on TheCorporateCounsel.net, the proposal would reduce the number of NEOs, substantially rework the tabular disclosures, revise the perks guidance and thresholds and make CD&A more principles based. It would also simplify the disclosures related to pay-versus-performance, CEO pay ratio and clawbacks. See this Mayer Brown blog for an explanation of those changes.

Since a number of resources from the SEC and other blogs already have summaries covered (also see this Cooley blog, Goodwin blog and this Meridian memo), here are a handful of interesting, surprising or helpful tidbits that jumped out at me.

Compensation disclosure in an S-1. Addressing one of the challenges that some issuers encounter when trying to raise capital early in a new year, the proposed rules would give issuers using Form S-1 120 days after fiscal year-end before executive compensation disclosure for the last completed fiscal year would need to be included in the registration statement.

Clawbacks. Only clawback-related disclosures are impacted, so clawbacks for so-called “little r” restatements remain. The proposing release notes that amendments to Rule 10D-1 and the related stock exchange rules are outside the scope of this proposal. But the checkboxes are gone! And registrants that conduct a recovery analysis and determine no recovery is required would no longer need to disclose why. (Though this strikes me as something some registrants may want to disclose voluntarily in some circumstances.)

XBRL. The Commission is proposing to require LAFs (large accelerated filers) to tag the Earned Compensation Table, Granted Compensation Table and Status of Equity Awards Table in Inline XBRL while eliminating the requirement to tag PvP and compensation recovery disclosures.

PvP would no longer require a new pay calculation. The proposed changes to PvP requirements would replace “Compensation Actually Paid” with the total from one of the three new tables, “Total Compensation Earned.”

Treatment of certain types of filers. The treatment of foreign private issuers was largely retained. No new accommodations for SRCs or EGCs are proposed in light of the expansion of scaled disclosure in the Filer Status proposal, which would extend all the scaled disclosures to NAFs (non-accelerated filers). However, the proposal would streamline the provisions governing the disclosure requirements and accommodations for SRCs and EGCs into paragraphs (a)(6)(i) and (ii) of Item 402, which eliminates the need for a separate set of disclosure provisions.

Tracking equity awards. One of the new tables is meant to “bridge the gap” between the other two new tables that cover granted and earned compensation by tracking each equity award. This is something investors have been asking for and came up repeatedly in the Executive Compensation Disclosure Roundtable.

Risk management. No more narrative disclosure regarding compensation policies and practices relating to risk management.

Timing of awards and MNPI. Also gone. The proposal would eliminate the disclosure required by Item 402(x) (both the policies and practices disclosure and the tabular disclosure of options granted around the time of a report disclosing MNPI).

Comments are due 60 days after publication of the proposal in the Federal Register. We’ll be posting the many memos that will be rolling in soon enough in our “SEC’s Rules” Practice Area.

– Meredith Ervine 

November 12, 2026

Does Equity Pay Incentivize Fraud? Only If Things Are Going Poorly…

This recent study from B-school professors at UT Dallas, Berkeley, UNC and China Europe International Business School examines whether CEO equity pay motivates fraud. In short, there’s a strong correlation with earnings management within the confines of GAAP, but fraud only tends to arise when company performance is looking desperate. Here’s the abstract:

Although CEO equity incentives are commonly believed to be positively associated with accounting manipulation, the empirical evidence is mixed (Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker 2010; Edmans, Gabaix, and Jenter 2017). We revisit this relation by first recognizing that accounting manipulation ranges from permissible interpretation of GAAP to outright fraud.

While equity incentives motivate CEOs to present more favorable performance through accrual earnings management, they do not inherently lead to fraud, largely because of the substantially higher costs of fraudulent behavior. Instead, fraud arises when CEOs face heightened pressure, such as prolonged poor performance. The positive relation between equity incentives and fraud emerges only under these conditions and is concentrated when equity incentives are excessive.

We thus reestablish the positive relation between equity incentives and accounting manipulation, but with a distinction prior work has overlooked. The relation is unconditional for within-GAAP earnings management and conditional on heightened pressure for accounting fraud.

– Liz Dunshee

November 10, 2026

Director Compensation: A Better Approach to “Skin in the Game”?

I blogged last month about the possibility of perfect alignment between executive pay and company performance. In this HLS blog, Stephen O’Byrne of Shareholder Value Advisors points out that director pay programs have drawn from the same conventional structures as executive pay – a portion of compensation in cash at market levels and a portion in equity to align directors’ incentives with shareholders’. But according to the blog, this approach to “skin in the game” may not be having the impact that’s intended – because director pay has fallen prey to a common misperception:

Directors and investors tend to think that 60% of pay in stock provides a similar incentive to 60% of wealth in stock, but, in fact, it provides an incentive that is much more varied and often much weaker.

In and of itself, awarding equity to directors isn’t a bad approach. The issue is in how the award amounts at grant and vesting are calculated. Here’s one contributing factor:

Setting target pay equal to market pay regardless of past performance creates a systematic “performance penalty” that reduces leverage and alignment. High stock returns are penalized with a reduction in grant shares (to avoid exceeding target pay), and poor stock returns are rewarded with an increase in grant shares (to maintain target pay).

To get to better alignment, Steve says that directors and investors should focus on “pay leverage” instead of percent of pay in equity. Pay leverage is the ratio of the percent change in cumulative pay, measured on a “mark to market” basis at each year end, to the percent change in cumulative shareholder wealth. Luckily, Steve also explains how to focus on pay leverage, which may be simpler than how it first appears. One step is setting target pay not just at a market value, but market adjusted for trailing relative performance, in order to correct the shortcoming noted above. Additionally:

[S]tock vesting [should take] out the industry component of the stock return. That is, the vesting multiple is 1/(1 + the industry return from the date of grant). Fourth, any cash paid out prior to the end of the measurement period [should be] treated as a draw against the value of the performance shares. In other words, in our context, all stock is held throughout our five year measurement period and doesn’t vest until the end of the five year period.

Reducing the percent of pay in stock reduces leverage but leaves pay alignment nearly perfect. If all directors had a cash retainer equal to 40% of their initial stock grant value and equity compensation that followed the provisions of the perfect correlation pay plan, director pay leverage and alignment would fall in a very narrow range.

Programming note: In observance of Veterans Day, this blog will not run tomorrow. We’ll return on Thursday. Thank you to all of our service members and service member families for your commitment and sacrifices.

– Liz Dunshee

November 9, 2026

CEO Performance Evaluations: Sample Annual Review Cycle

As Meredith blogged last week, compensation committees that connect the CEO compensation-setting process to the CEO performance review process are able to make and communicate pay decisions with better context. This Semler Brossy memo shares a sample annual review cycle that helps align these two important processes:

– Goal Presentation (March): The CEO presents annual goals to the Compensation Committee for alignment.

– Mid-Year Check-In (July): The CEO delivers a progress update against annual goals.

– Review Preview (October): The Compensation Committee finalizes assessment questions and processes — including target focus areas, a timeline for completion, and the self-review process — and shares a plan for the upcoming review, highlighting key focus areas such as leadership and strategic and financial direction.”

– CEO Self-Assessment (December): This assessment is shared with the full board as context for upcoming performance discussions.

– Active Review (January): Selected Compensation Committee members can divide up board interviews or send all board members an anonymous survey. In both cases, the Compensation Committee will meet to compile themes and key messages. The Compensation Committee refines those themes (sometimes with the help of a compensation consultant) and shares them with the full board for additional input.

– Results and Performance Review (February): The Board Chair and Compensation Committee Chair present the final review to the Compensation Committee and full board. The committee considers results in the context of next year’s pay decisions. Selected board members, such as the Board Chair and Compensation Chair, schedule and share findings with the CEO, then report back to the full board on how the feedback was received and any necessary follow-up. Ideally, the CEO would also use the next meeting to reflect on the feedback and discuss how it will inform the goals for the coming year.

While it is not included in the above calendar, it can be useful to also schedule a follow-up conversation with the CEO after their performance review. Doing so gives them time to reflect on the feedback and ask questions. The board may also consider setting aside time for its own review of the cycle to determine whether any changes for the following year are warranted.

The memo also dives into the pros and cons of various methods for collecting feedback and offers tips for delivering (sometimes difficult) messages in a way that your CEO can accept and positively act on it. Members can access more resources on these topics in our “Compensation Committees” and “Determining How Much Pay is Appropriate” Practice Areas.

– Liz Dunshee

November 5, 2026

Expanded Definition of 162(m) “Covered Employee” Effective Soon

For a few years now, we’ve periodically noted that the 2021 American Rescue Plan Act amended the definition of “covered employee” to add a public company’s five highest compensated employees (even if they are not executive officers) for tax years beginning January 1, 2027 and thereafter. January 1, 2027 is now right around the corner!

This Davis Polk alert addresses some frequently asked questions about the expanded definition. For example:

Q: Will the five highest compensated employees for 2027 be identified based on 2026 or 2027 compensation?  This question has not been expressly addressed. Using 2026 compensation would allow companies to identify their five highest compensated employees at the start of 2027. However, because ARPA states, “in the case of taxable years beginning after December 31, 2026, such employee is among the 5 highest compensated employees for the taxable year” (emphasis added), the determination will likely be based on 2027 compensation. If so, companies may not be able to identify these employees until after the end of their 2027 taxable year.

It also suggests some steps that companies may want to take to prepare:

– Review their employee populations to make a preliminary assessment as to who may be their covered employees beginning in 2027,

– Confirm that their systems for tracking compensation are sufficient for this purpose, and

– Consider whether to accelerate any compensation that would otherwise be paid in 2027 into 2026, if it is likely to be disallowed as a tax deduction for 2027.

Check out our “Section 162(m) Compliance” Practice Area.

– Meredith Ervine 

November 4, 2026

How CEO Performance Evaluations Should Inform CEO Pay

Does this sound familiar?

Most boards have a process for evaluating CEO performance, and most compensation committees have a process for determining CEO pay. Too often, however, those processes operate more independently than they should.

These are the opening lines of this Pearl Meyer alert discussing how to connect CEO performance evaluations to compensation decisions. It says the evaluation and compensation processes should be distinct, but connected, and shares some tips.

One useful practice is to complete the CEO performance evaluation before reaching conclusions on compensation. Doing so helps the board develop a view of performance on its own merits rather than working backward from a particular pay outcome. The compensation committee can then consider what, if any, implications the evaluation should have for compensation.

The process should begin at the start of the performance cycle, when the board and CEO agree on the CEO’s priorities and expectations. Objectives should reflect the company’s strategy and include both quantitative and qualitative measures [. . .] Documenting those expectations helps avoid a common problem: introducing new performance considerations at year-end that were never clearly communicated to the CEO.

In terms of implications for pay, the outcome of the evaluation may provide good context for where the CEO’s pay should be positioned relative to market, and the compensation committee may choose to reflect the evaluation in one or more ways:

– Annual incentive outcomes, particularly where the plan incorporates individual or strategic performance.
– Salary adjustments, although these are generally a relatively small component of CEO compensation.
– Future long-term incentive opportunities, where sustained leadership performance or strategic progress may inform grant sizing.
– Special recognition or retention decisions, particularly during periods of significant transformation or unusual leadership demands.
– The evaluation may also lead the board to conclude that no compensation adjustment is appropriate. Not every aspect of CEO performance needs to result in an incremental pay action.

– Meredith Ervine 

November 3, 2026

Peer Groups: ISS Submission Window Opening November 9th

Yesterday, ISS announced that for companies with annual meetings between February 1, 2027 and September 15, 2027, its peer group review & submission window will open at 9:00 AM ET on Monday, November 9, 2026, and will close at 8:00 PM ET on Friday, November 20, 2026. Submissions should reflect peer companies used (or to be used) by the submitting company for pay-setting for the fiscal year ending prior to the company’s next upcoming annual meeting (so for your 2027 annual meeting, this would mean peers used for the 2026 fiscal year).

Here’s a reminder from the press release:

As part of ISS’ peer group construction process, on a semi-annual basis, corporations are requested to submit changes they have made to their self-selected peer groups for their next proxy disclosure. ISS considers companies’ self-selected peer groups as an important input as part of its own peer group construction methodology.

Companies that have made no changes to their previous proxy-disclosed executive compensation benchmarking peers, or companies that do not wish to provide this information in advance, are under no obligation to participate. For companies that do not submit any information, the proxy-disclosed peers from the company’s last proxy filing will automatically be factored into ISS’ peer group construction process.

– Meredith Ervine