The Advisors' Blog

This blog features wisdom from respected compensation consultants and lawyers

November 14, 2012

Say-on-Pay: Now 60 Failures

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

I’ve added one more company to our failed say-on-pay list for 2012 as PMFG failed during the past week with 31% support. We are now at 60 companies in ’12 that have failed to garner major support. Hat tip to Karla Bos of ING Funds for keeping me updated.

Notice that the PMFG Chair, who is the retired CEO and on the Comp Committee, lost the vote also for his own re-election to the board. This, along with Oracle’s compensation committee members losing their re-election vote if you exclude the CEO Ellison’s shares, should be sending a chill to directors. Hat tip to Fred Whittlesey for pointing this out!

November 13, 2012

Retention Packages in M&A: Troubles with Separating Votes on Deal & Pay

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

Check out this Chicago Tribune article entitled “Analysis: Xstrata investors get pay vote but may not risk stand“:

That could be advice for corporate governance advocates who sought a separate vote on the lavish executive pay deal that was bundled in as part of the terms of the $33 billion merger between Glencore and Xstrata. Thanks to a voting structure shake-up, shareholders will now be able to vote for the deal without the pay, and have an option to reject the proposed retention packages, achieving what looks like a victory against excessive boardroom remuneration.

But as unpopular as the retention packages are, fund managers may prove too worried about threatening the commercial promise of the union – and going against the advice of Xstrata’s board – to risk making a stand.That means at the end of the day, Glencore and Xstrata executives are likely to get both their merger and their pay, while silencing critics who had initially accused them of ramming the deal through without a separate pay vote.

One former Xstrata shareholder, who sold out of his position soon after the Glencore merger talks began, described the awkward dilemma facing shareholders as “appalling”. “There’s nothing wrong with paying executives well if the shareholders are doing well too. But the whole obfuscation that is going on here and across the industry on pay, we are very much against,” the fund manager said, asking not to be identified while discussing an investment decision on a deal that is still up in the air. “The idea that you can be paid a lot before investors have made any money is ridiculous. Retention packages? Why have any of that? Why shouldn’t we just pay people well after they have performed?”

Instead of a single up-or-down vote on a merger including the pay deal, shareholders will now have three votes: to allow the merger if the pay deal is approved, to allow the merger to go ahead without the pay deal, and finally an up-or-down vote on the pay deal itself. That means that when the vote on the pay deal finally takes place, shareholders will know whether their decision would scupper the merger or not. The voting shake-up plays on a division of responsibility at fund houses, whereby separate teams shape views on the logic of the merger and on resolutions linked to governance issues like incentives and bonuses.

“This separation of investment and corporate governance decision-making is a problem that requires addressing,” said Simon Wong, a partner at Governance for Owners, a fund manager that invests on the premise that guarantees of shareholder rights improve long-term returns. “Under the bundled scenario, the corporate governance and investment teams have to work together to reconcile views. Now they can just vote separately, and the likely objections to the retention package and corporate governance will be much less consequential.”

Bundled resolutions are broadly unpopular as they force investors into a binary choice on a complex deal and all its accompanying terms, preventing managers from fully expressing a view on remuneration or corporate governance issues without jeopardizing a deal that on balance makes investment sense. In this case, some investors may accept management’s argument that the future success of the merged group relies on how many of Xstrata’s operational staff remain in their roles.

Unlike in other mergers, there is little overlap in revenue-generating staff between Glencore and Xstrata. Were many Xstrata staff to leave and take their revenue streams with them, that could cost investors more than they gain from curbing pay. Miner Xstrata will be tying its future to trader Glencore at a turning point as it moves from an acquisition-fuelled first decade to a period of organic growth, intended to boost volumes by 50 percent and cut costs.

Among the projects set to come on stream are Koniambo, a challenging greenfield ferronickel mine in New Caledonia, and the Las Bambas copper project in Peru. Investors may conclude that now is no time to risk losing staff. “Investors should make a joined up decision, to say – we may not like the retention packages but on balance, do we need them because these executives are so essential to the merged entity? The way the deal is now structured, means that you can almost divorce the two,” Wong added.

OPPOSITION

With its opaque image and corporate governance record, Glencore’s bid to merge with Xstrata has provoked opposition from institutional owners of the miner at every turn. Some asset managers like Threadneedle and Schroders feel Glencore – Xstrata’s biggest shareholder – is forcing through a deal that fails to reward fellow investors for their long-term support of the miner or for the increased volatility on future returns that a union with Glencore would probably bring.

Xstrata shareholders who have opposed the deal from the outset have had to weigh the merits of speaking out against the union and the risk of inflicting damage to the share price. Even after heated battles on pay at a number of companies this year, in a series of votes that became known among corporate governance advocates as the “shareholder spring”, fund managers proved reluctant to actually vote down pay deals which could spur talented executives to take their skills elsewhere. Data compiled by Legal & General Investment Management showed just six remuneration reports were voted down this year.

If the Xstrata pay deal is rejected and the merger goes ahead without it, there is no clarity on what terms the merged company would then decide offer Xstrata staff. Investors in a merged firm without the pay deal may find they have less clout because votes on pay could be advisory rather than binding. Nigel Read, partner at law firm Hogan Lovells in London, said the voting shake-up was “quite a clever tactical ploy” to make sure that if people are wavering they will vote in line with the advice of the Xstrata independent directors. He thinks investors are now more likely to take that guidance than risk scuppering the deal altogether.

This sort of decoupling may become the prevalent custom, said Read, as management boards seek to retain influence while addressing the concerns of disaffected shareholders. In both bundled and unbundled votes, funds say they are aware how vulnerable they are to manipulation.

While declining to comment directly on the merger while the deal is pending, large Xstrata shareholder Legal & General Investment Management said it has had to weigh similar issues in the past, when pay packages were linked to deals. “There have been some corporate events where the companies have tried to put horrendous pay packages through that have been linked to the corporate action and we’ve had to say yes and sign it off because we want the actual corporate event to happen,” said Angeli Benham, LGIM’s UK Corporate Governance Manager.

November 7, 2012

“Say-on-Pay” Soon in France?

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

Here’s news from the Glass Lewis Blog:

After targeting executive remuneration at state-controlled companies with new regulation introducing pay caps for CEOs, France’s new government is now considering potentially sweeping reforms for all public companies. In a recent consultation paper released by the Finance Ministry (see Glass Lewis’ response), market participants were asked to comment on numerous questions mainly focused on the approval and structure of executive pay. While shareholders at French companies are currently entitled to resolve on equity-based incentives and severance payments, a vote on a company’s pay practices is either recommended by the AFEP-MEDEF Code (the reference corporate governance code for the majority of French issuers) or required by law. However, France could soon enlarge the number of European countries introducing say-on-pay proposals. The consultation inquiry, in fact, seeks comments on whether such mechanism allowing shareholders to voice their concerns over poorly designed pay policies should be envisaged and whether it should be binding or advisory in nature.

Regarding certain components of variable remuneration such as stock options and restricted shares, the French government goes so far as to consider a ban among the possible policy options. Moreover, the introduction of deferral mechanisms and claw-back provisions is considered in the Finance Ministry’s inquiry together with a requirement for French issuers to allow employee representatives to serve on remuneration committees. Interestingly, the consultation paper also raises some preliminary issues over the scope and nature of any new proposed measures, with the debate centering on the choice between binding legal provisions or “comply-or-explain” best practices.

During his presidential campaign Mr. Holland promised to curb excessively generous pay packages with the French government opposing the severance pay for Safran’s CEO and an indemnity pursuant to a non-compete agreement paid to Air France-KLM’s former CEO. The extent to which the government will be successful in forcing changes at companies where it does not hold a controlling or majority stake will be soon clear as the new measures are expected to be announced in the fall.

November 5, 2012

TSR & Management Performance: A Metric Appropriately Used, or Mostly Abused?

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

In our “Pay-for-Performance” Practice Area, I recently posted this article by Roland Burgman and Mark Van Clieaf that “identifies the issues associated with the unconsidered use of TSR as a metric to represent the gains (or otherwise) in shareholder wealth and in contexts such as long-term incentive compensation and proxy voting by shareholders (including “say on pay”). Not all TSR is created equal. Other measures, such as economic profit (EP), return on invested capital (ROIC), and future value (FV), need to be introduced to effectively interpret the quality of TSR. There are not one but eight states of the quality of TSR, and this has implications for effectively evaluating true pay-for-performance alignment and considered say-on-pay voting by institutional investors everywhere.”

October 31, 2012

For Whom Golden Parachutes Shine

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

Here is a DealBook column entitled “For Whom Golden Parachutes Shine” penned by Harvard Prof. Lucian Bebchuk that explains a recent study. Here is an excerpt:

We confirm that golden parachutes do indeed have a beneficial effect on acquisitions. We find that companies that offer such packages have a higher likelihood of both receiving an acquisition offer and being acquired.

Because golden parachutes make executives more eager to sell, they are also associated with lower premiums in the event of an acquisition. But this effect is sufficiently small so that, over all, golden parachutes are associated with higher expected gains from acquisitions. On average, shareholders in companies with golden parachutes pocket larger benefits from acquisition premiums, and we find evidence that this association is produced by the effect that golden parachutes have on executives’ incentives.

So far, so good. However, when we look beyond acquisitions to examine the relationship between golden parachutes and company value, we find that such packages hardly shine for the shareholders of companies adopting them. Companies that have adopted golden parachutes tend to see their valuations (relative to their industry peers) erode over time. Such companies have lower valuation already before adopting a golden parachute, but their value declines further in the subsequent several years.

We find a similar pattern when analyzing the stock returns of companies with and without a golden parachute during the period of more than 15 years for which we have data. Companies that adopted golden parachutes have lower (risk-adjusted) stock returns relative to those that didn’t – both during the two-year period surrounding the adoption and in the next several years.

What explains this pattern? Why do companies with golden parachutes fail to deliver for their shareholders overall even though they provide them with more benefits in the form of acquisition premiums? This pattern could be at least partly a result of the adverse effect that golden parachutes have on the incentives and performance of executives not facing an acquisition offer.

The market for corporate control benefits shareholders not just by providing the prospect of pocketing an acquisition premium but also by affecting performance more generally. Executives face the possibility that they might be ousted if they underperform. By ensuring executives of a cushy landing in the event of an acquisition, golden parachutes weaken the disciplinary force exerted by the market for corporate control.

Our corporate system provides executives with a significant power to impede or facilitate an acquisition. Golden parachutes are offered as a remedy to the concern that executives will deviate from shareholder interests in exercising this power. But this remedy is a highly imperfect one. While it does lead to more acquisitions, it also carries significant countervailing costs with it. Golden parachutes are not the easy fix for the incentives of executives as some might have hoped.

More work should be done to fully understand the consequences of golden parachutes and how they should be used. In the meantime, however, the evidence suggests that investors should continue to pay close attention to the use — and potential costs — of golden parachutes.

October 29, 2012

Banker Compensation to be Focus in Obama Second Term?

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

According to this Reuter’s article:

In an interview published on Friday in Rolling Stone magazine, Obama said that despite passage of Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation, there is more to be done to make financial markets safe after the damage caused by the crisis of 2007-2009.

“The single biggest thing that I would like to see is changing incentives on Wall Street and how people get compensated,” Obama said. It’s questionable, even after enactment of Dodd-Frank reforms, that those incentives have completely been changed, he added. The Rolling Stone interview stirred controversy because of the president’s use, at one point, of a barnyard epithet that some saw as an attack on Republican Mitt Romney.

The White House did not dispute the remarks but a re-election campaign official stressed that the comments were “part of a casual conversation at the end of the interview.” The wide-ranging interview covers Obama’s first term, what he views as his biggest accomplishments and his fierce fight with Romney for the White House.

The president and Romney are running neck and neck ahead of the Nov. 6 election and have stepped up their campaigning. Obama points to financial reform as a signature accomplishment of his four years in office and says the overhaul will prevent a repeat of the devastating crisis that caused the loss of more than 8 million jobs and erased an estimated $19 trillion in household wealth.

However Dodd-Frank reforms are deeply unpopular with the financial industry and many businesses, who say an avalanche of new requirements stands in the way of hiring new workers and making fresh investments, thus holding back the broader economic recovery. Romney has promised to repeal provisions of the 2010 Dodd-Frank law if elected.

Obama said the stability of markets is still at risk because people making risky bets are handsomely rewarded if the bets pay off, but face limited consequences if those bets go sour. “It tilts the whole system in favor of very risky behavior,” he said. “By the time the chickens come home to roost, they’re still way ahead of the game.” Such changes are not entirely up to passing laws in Washington and may require shareholders or company directors to act, Obama said. Changes to the executive compensation system cannot entirely be legislated, he said.

Another challenge to ensuring greater financial stability in the future will be to ensure that the rules that prohibit banks that receive government backstop from making risky trades — the so called Volcker Rule – is adequately enforced, Obama said. Progress in implementing the rule was slowed when regulators received thousands of comment letters. Two influential U.S. senators on Thursday urged regulators to resolve differences and finish writing the rules before the end of the year.

October 24, 2012

CII Gets Specific on Clawback Recommendations

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

From this Pensions & Investments article:

The Council of Institutional Investors on Friday approved a new policy specifying that current and former executive officers should be subject to corporate clawback provisions on bonuses, incentive pay and compensation in cases of corporate fraud or misstatement of financial results.CII’s previous policy only mentioned executive officers and gave no further guidance.Also under the new policy, incentive-based compensation should be subject to a recovery period of at least three years.

In a policy statement, CII said the revised language makes it clear than an executive should not be able to terminate eligibility for clawbacks simply by leaving the company. The statement says that the amended language will help ensure that the council is prepared to comment on the SEC’s proposed rule on clawbacks.

The SEC is required under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to implement a clawback policy, but it is unclear when the commission will issue its draft rule. CII also amended its policy that opposes corporations subjecting shareholder lawsuits to mandatory court arbitration to include all corporations globally. The previous policy only mentioned U.S. companies.

CII said it doesn’t object to voluntary arbitration for example, between a company and an investor. It said the intent of its expanded policy is to discourage the type of provision put forth by the Carlyle Group before it went public earlier this year to prohibit unit holders from having access to the court in case of a dispute. Carlyle officials later withdrew the policy that would have subject unit holders to mandatory arbitration. The changes were recommended by CII’s board and approved by members in closed session Friday morning. CII has no enforcement powers, but its member pension funds as shareholders vote on corporate board members and individual officers.