The Advisors' Blog

This blog features wisdom from respected compensation consultants and lawyers

August 18, 2009

Options Exchange Programs in Window Periods

Art Meyers, Seyfarth Shaw

This query was recently posted in the Q&A Forum:

“In the wake of the options backdating scandal, companies adopted equity grant policies that typically provide for fixed grant dates that occur during open window periods. In the case of an options exchange program, would you expect that the same considerations should apply to the grant date (i.e., the closing date of the exchange offer) of the new options to be granted? I would expect that it would, as otherwise, a claim could be made that the new options were timed to take advantage of material non-public information.

The second and related question is whether the same considerations should apply to the launch date of the options exchange program when the exchange ratios are set for a value-for-value option exchange. If there was negative news, that news might adversely affect the ratios and participating employees arguably could claim that they were harmed (although the disclosures in the tender offer documents typically state that the valuations could change and the employees would know the news before the expiration date, so that they could withdraw). However, if there was positive news, the participating employees likely would be receiving a greater number of options than they would have received if the exchange ratios had been calculated at the later date. Do you think this is a significant concern such that the SEC might question the timing?”

I responded that I think that exchange programs raise similar backdating issues as option grants, but they are perhaps a bit easier to resolve because the program is publicly-known and there is sufficient lead time to plan. Very few companies have the ability to conduct an exchange without shareholder approval and a tender offer. It seems to me that the shareholder approval process (both the CD&A and the specific proposal) as well as the tender offer provide good opportunities to both communicate the general terms of the timing of the exchange and any necessary modifications to the company’s grant practice policies.

The company will be able to establish the specific exchange period well in advance. It will presumably use the same care for the exchange that it uses in establishing regular grant cycles, or in making off-cycle awards. It ought to be able to plan for an exchange occurring during an open window. Also, the NEOs and directors are usually ineligible to participate in the exchange, thus eliminating a significant class of potentially problematic insiders. Of course, there is the risk that the exchange period may be required to be lengthened or that new material inside information arises (regarding an M&A transaction, for example) during the regrant period.

I believe that many of the timing issues can be dealt with by including within the terms of the tender offer (as most companies do) a right of the company to declare certain electing participants ineligible for the program during or shortly after the window. Presumably the directors, NEOs, company counsel and other compliance personnel ought to be able to reach a consensus at the end of the window whether anyone needs to be declared ineligible. Replacing options with restricted stock or restricted stock units would seem to take off some pressure too. The only blackout period required by law on option regrants would be the BTR rules applicable if a company is changing service providers for its 401(k) plan and has a stock fund that will be closed for more than three days.

August 17, 2009

Executive Pay a Decade Ago

Recently, Directors & Boards re-ran this interesting article that originally appeared in their Summer ’97 issue. Author Harold Geneen was CEO of International Telephone and Telegraph from ’59 til ’77:

Geneen on Executive Pay

You have to ask, “What are corporations paying those megamillions for?” The solemn answer comes back from the board of directors: “Demonstrated capability.” But if the company is doing well, surely the CEO’s predecessors deserve some credit. I propose breaking up Fortune 500 chief executives’ pay, giving one half to the incumbents and splitting the other half among his demonstrably capable predecessors and their heirs.

Absurd? Of course. That’s the point. At the moment, there is no logic in these things. The size of the pay package is dictated by habit. To be sure, most companies will hire consultants to advise them on an “appropriate level” of compensation, but all they do is tote up what everybody else in the industry is making and recommend that their clients pay roughly the same. They are, after all, eager to please their clients’ bosses. As I said, it’s a matter of habit.

This also leads to a steady escalation in the size of compensation packages. Are CEOs worth their paychecks? If so, by what standards? Who sets the standards? Who enforces them? To what extent does dumb luck decide the total?

All good questions — and ones that can’t be answered by outbursts of moral indignation. Once we let our gut reaction to supposed excesses guide our social policy, we will be well on the way to socialism.

Going Beyond Hot Air

I have a suggestion. Why not just use logic? To start off, why not ask: What is excessive? There should be some measure of reasonableness. You have to set some objective standards for measuring worth. Otherwise, all you get is hot air. One critic says, “This is unfair. Who can be worth that much?” And the CEO’s defenders retort, “That’s the price of genius.”

If I had to choose, I would err on the side of paying too much for proven performance. It’s a risk, but it’s a smart risk. However, I would ask a lot of questions: Was the performance really as extraordinary as everybody seems to think? Against what odds did he achieve it? How did the company’s profits and stock price stack up against others in the same industry?

Unfortunately, most boards don’t delve too deeply into the methodology of calculating the true worth of performance. Doing so might ruffle feathers. Much easier to follow the practice of posing two simple questions to the CEO: What did you make last year? And what should your increase be this year?

I’m oversimplifying, of course. Boards deliberate the question of the CEO’s pay with great solemnity. Then, nine times out of 10, they approve a double-digit raise.

‘What Are You Worth?’

Only when a company is desperately seeking a new chief to put its house in order does the question become: What are you worth? Unfortunately, in such a crisis, the rigorous analysis that would make sense in ordinary times becomes irrelevant. All the probing of the candidate’s strengths and weaknesses boils down to a single question: Can he save the company?

If the answer is “no,” he is worth nothing. If the answer is “probably not,” he is worth nothing. If the answer is “maybe,” he is worth nothing. If the answer is “probably,” he is worth nothing. Only if the answer is “yes” is he worth even a penny. But in that case, he is worth pretty much whatever he asks.

While it would be a mistake to assume that the number of prodigies capable of running a big corporation is so small that boards have no choice but to pay them $5 million or more, it would also be a mistake to shrink from paying whatever it costs to get the best. After all, it is the most important investment a company ever makes.

So important, in fact, that the question shouldn’t be: How much does he, or she, cost? The main question is: How do we know he really is the best?

August 13, 2009

Steve Jobs On “The Value of Stock Options”

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

As I’m now on my first lengthy vacation of this decade, I’ve tee’d up a few blogs on matters that I’ve been meaning to blog about – except for new developments got in the way. For example, the TechCrunch blog ran this interesting piece – Steve Jobs On “The Value of Stock Options” – back in April…

August 12, 2009

Survey Results: Corporate Airplane Use by Outside Directors

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

We recently wrapped up our Quick Survey on “Corporate Airplane Use by Outside Directors.” Below are our results:

1. At our company, when it comes to allowing non-employee directors to use the company’s plane to travel to – and from – board meetings:
– Yes, we allow – but we disclose the aggregate incremental costs associated with such use as director perks in the Director Compensation Table – 1.0%
– Yes, we allow – but we believe such travel is for a business purpose and thus do not disclose it in the proxy statement – 60.8%
– Yes, we allow – but we believe such travel is for a business purpose and therefore only disclose that such travel is permitted in the narrative portion of the proxy statement – 12.4%
– Yes, we allow – but only a percentage of the amounts associated with such use is considered for a business purpose – so some of the cost is disclosed in the Director Compensation Table – 0.0%
– No, we don’t allow non-employee directors to fly on the company plane to our board meetings – 7.2%
– No, as a result of a recent change in our travel policy, we no longer allow non-employee directors to fly on the company plane to board meetings – 1.0%
– We don’t have a company plane – 17.5%

Please take a moment to respond anonymously to respond to our “Quick Survey on “Affiliates” for Rule 144 Purposes.”

August 11, 2009

Posted: Summer Issue of Compensation Standards Print Newsletter

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

We just dropped the Summer 2009 issue of the Compensation Standards print newsletter in the mail (remember that as a member of this site, you get the print newsletter as a bonus). Since the issue provides timely analysis of all the regulatory reforms that have recently taken place, we have posted the issue online (use link above) since you may want to read it now and get up-to-speed on the radical changes taking place in the executive pay area.

August 10, 2009

Pay Czar Quietly Meets With Rescued Companies

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

It is worth reading this Washington Post article from yesterday to get a sense of where the Obama Administration’s pay czar – Ken Feinberg – is heading as he gears up to help set pay at seven companies by this Thursday’s deadline. Below is the text from the article:

President Obama’s compensation czar has been meeting for weeks with executives at some of the country’s largest and most troubled companies as they face a Thursday deadline to propose how much they will pay their top employees. Kenneth R. Feinberg has the unprecedented task of deciding executive compensation at seven companies that received large government bailouts. His meetings with American International Group, Citigroup, Bank of America, General Motors, Chrysler, Chrysler Financial and GMAC have been conducted in secret, with neither Feinberg nor the companies willing to say much in public. But one window into this opaque process is an account provided by people familiar with his discussions with AIG, the crippled insurer that has received tens of billions of dollars in federal rescue money.

Last month, Feinberg’s face flashed across the video screens at corporate offices in London, Paris and Wilton, Conn. Over the better part of an hour, AIG employees on both sides of the Atlantic peppered him with questions about their compensation, recalled several people familiar with the videoconference. What could happen to the bonuses they were promised? Would he try to alter their contracts? How would the company’s pay structure change?

Some of AIG’s highest earners work in these offices, which are home to its financial products division. In March, the division’s employees were paid $165 million in retention bonuses, triggering national outrage. More than $200 million more are scheduled to come due in 2010. After the public uproar this spring, the government brought in Feinberg to help it address — and defuse — one of the most politically sensitive issues it faces.

Feinberg, who has sole discretion to set compensation for the top 25 employees of each of those companies, has 60 days to make a determination after the proposals are complete. Under the administration’s initiative to curb excessive pay practices, each of the seven companies must also receive his approval for how it pays the rest of its 100 most highly compensated executives and employees. The companies must submit pay plans for these employees by Oct. 12.

With Congress and the public already exasperated by the hefty pay awarded to Wall Street bankers, Feinberg is under intense pressure to put checks on excessive pay. But if he goes too far, the companies he oversees could lose their rainmakers and other key executives to rival firms that are not subject to similar pay restrictions.

“I wish I could hum the theme song for ‘Mission: Impossible’ because I think his job is mission impossible,” said Robert Profusek, a lawyer at Jones Day who has advised major banks on compensation matters. “On the one hand, there’s this populist outrage that is fanned every other day by somebody in Washington. . . . But he can’t just go in there with a hatchet and cut everything because the good people will leave. That’s not in our best interest” as taxpayers.

The seven companies are still finalizing the pay plans due Thursday, and several possible approaches are being discussed, say people with knowledge of the deliberations. All seek to give employees an incentive to care about the long-term health of their company instead of short-term gain. They include extending the time that executives must wait before cashing in on restricted stock awards, boosting the proportion of pay that comes in the form of company stock, and adding stronger clawback provisions that allow firms under certain conditions to take back compensation they’ve already paid.

During the videoconference with AIG employees, Feinberg mostly avoided giving them detailed answers to their questions. Many of the employees left frustrated because he gave them no sense of whether he would seek to modify contracts that promise them upcoming bonuses, said people familiar with the session.

Legally, Feinberg cannot prohibit bonuses that were promised before the February passage of the stimulus bill, which included new compensation restrictions for companies receiving government rescue funds. That includes, for example, retention payments to AIG employees. He could try to renegotiate those bonuses if he thinks they’re against the public interest, according to the rules on new compensation.

He could also take these bonuses into account when evaluating an employee’s overall compensation package. For example, if a company proposes giving an executive $1 million in compensation and a $500,000 bonus later this year, Feinberg could subtract the $500,000 from the proposed pay package, in effect negating the bonus.

Even for Feinberg, who oversaw the complex process of paying compensation to victims of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, this latest mission is a delicate balancing act. Senior Treasury Department officials say they do not want Feinberg to set precise prescriptions for how companies compensate employees. Instead, his task is to evaluate pay according to several principles. For instance, does an employee’s compensation reward short-term, risky business behavior? Or, on the contrary, is the compensation tied to longer-term performance goals? Does it allow the company to remain competitive and recruit top talent?

Already, banks such as Goldman Sachs, which recently returned its bailout funds to the government, have set aside enough money that they could resume paying year-end bonuses on the same scale as they did before the financial crisis. That has boosted Citigroup and Bank of America’s argument that they must be free to keep their pay competitive. Further complicating Feinberg’s mission is the assortment of companies under his watch. They include banks, financing firms and automakers, and the industries traditionally pay their executives differently. For each company, he will have to assess the role individual employees play and their ability to generate revenue.

During their discussions, Feinberg has yet to provide executives with a clear sense of how he plans to evaluate their pay proposals. While the pay packages will become public information, the companies have been reluctant to divulge details as they negotiate with Feinberg.

Bank of America said it was “taking the steps necessary to attract and retain key talent and respond to competitive pressures” and that it was looking forward to “working cooperatively with Mr. Feinberg to ensure we comply with all applicable compensation regulations outlined by the Treasury.” Citigroup and AIG declined to comment. Gina Proia, a spokeswoman for GMAC, said the company was “working with the appropriate officials, and obviously attracting and retaining key talent is critical.”

GM spokesman Tom Wilkinson said that traditionally the pay packages at the carmaker “have not been particularly rich.” He added, “We’re very sensitive to trying to make the relationship with the government a mutually beneficial one.” Chrysler Financial, meanwhile, said it was working with Feinberg to “seek advice and input with regard to our compensation plans.” A Chrysler spokeswoman said the company did not want to discuss the package it was putting together for Feinberg.

On Thursday, Feinberg should have seven proposals on his desk, each with its own set of potential land mines. “You’ve got to allow these companies to make the money for the shareholders,” said Linda Rappaport, head of the executive compensation practice at the firm Shearman & Sterling. “And to make the money for the shareholders, they have to have the talent. And to have the talent, they have to be able to pay them competitively.”

August 7, 2009

The SEC’s “Holy Cow” Moment: Judge May Overturn BofA’s Settlement over Merrill Lynch Bonuses

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

As I head out for a two-week email-free vacation (I have some blogs tee’d up to go out while I’m gone), I have to admit surprise by Judge Jed Rakoff’s decision to not approve this week’s settlement between the SEC and Bank of America over allegations of misleading proxy materials because the bonus obligations due to Merrill Lynch employees were not fully disclosed.

BofA had agreed to pay a $33 million fine, which I suggested recently was on the high side for a non-scienter violation. Personally, I thought the SEC was trying a new approach and acting fast – as bringing charges against individuals will take considerably longer. Take my poll below to express what you think.

According to this Reuters article, the Judge’s order states: “Despite the public importance of this case, the proposed consent judgment would leave uncertain the truth of the very serious allegations made in the complaint.” The order is linked from this “WSJ Law Blog.” Judge Rakoff will hold a hearing on the case on Monday in his US District Court, Southern District of New York.

Poll: The SEC and Bank of America Settlement

Take a moment to participate in this anonymous poll:

Online Surveys & Market Research

August 6, 2009

Executive Pay Surveys

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

In this podcast, Susan Wolf of Schering-Plough describes her company’s experience with using a survey to canvas shareholders about their executive pay practices, including:

– Why did the company decide to try a survey?
– What was the reaction of shareholders?
– Were there any surprises? What would you change if you did it again?

August 5, 2009

Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: The Banks Never Stopped Paying Bonuses

Paul Hodgson, The Corporate Library

Below is something I recently posted on “The Corporate Library” Blog:

Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: The Banks Never Stopped Paying Bonuses

What am I talking about? Surprised that they’ve returned so soon to the bad old ways of short-term bonuses? They never even stopped.

Using powers unavailable to mere researchers, Andrew Cuomo, NYC’s Attorney General has forced the banks to fess up what they did on bonuses last year. Yes, LAST year. AS they were driving the rest of the economy down the pipe. AND as they were asking the government for money – or being forced to accept it.

No Rhyme or Reason – The ‘Heads I win, Tails You Lose’ Bank Bonus Culture (see, you don’t even have to make this up!) is a 22-page report that concludes after months of investigation:

Thus, when the banks did well, their employees were paid well. When the banks did poorly, their employees were paid well. And when the banks did very poorly, they were bailed out by taxpayers and their employees were still paid well.

The report lists banks paying out more in bonuses than they received in income (Goldman, Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan Chase), in some cases with half the TARP funding being paid out in bonuses. Others paid out billions in bonuses while seeing a loss (Citigroup and Merrill Lynch). Bank of America and Citigroup saw performance crippled in 2008, yet compensation expenses stayed at EXACTLY the same level as they had in 2007, one of the best bull years.

O.K. O.K. I’m sorry about all the capital letters, but really, I’m surprised this whole report isn’t printed in UPPER CASE. It’s certainly well calculated to make the blood of any shareholder (or Congressman) boil. The usual excuses for this kind of behavior are offered, in this case by Merrill Lynch executives, that employees in units that performed well should not suffer because of the huge losses engendered by other less successful units.

But somewhere along the line the overall financial health of the whole firm must be taken into account (phew, got through that sentence without any upper case at all).

Johnny and Jane’s Allowances

Let’s try and liken this to family finances to try and bring it down to the level of common sense and reality, rather than the fantasy and lunacy that reigns on Wall Street and in the other banks.

Mom and Dad bring in a good pay packet each week. Johnny and Jane have their list of chores and get their allowances for doing them each week. Let’s see food and lodging as base salary and allowances as bonuses. But then Dad loses his job, has to stay home, and takes over Johnny and Jane’s chores during the week, when they are at school. The dishwasher continues to get stacked, the laundry done, the lawn mowed, the trash put out. Johnny and Jane aren’t doing the chores any more, and the family income is halved so their allowances are cancelled. Fair enough. But then Dad starts going out looking for other work and has to attend interviews, he’s away most of the time, or at home writing applications, working on his resume. Johnny and Jane have to take up the chores again. But do they get their allowances back?

Yeah.

When Dad gets another job.

That’s how real people live.

Let’s push it a step further. There are bills to pay, right? Like debt, like “dividends to shareholders”, what is Mom going to do? Tell the utility company that she can’t afford to pay the electricity bill because Johnny and Jane need their allowances? Tell the bank that she can’t pay the mortgage because Johnny and Jane need their allowances or they’ll GO AND DO THE NEIGHBOR’S CHORES INSTEAD AND GET PAID BY THEM!? That’s a sure fire way to get your house repossessed.

And what if they had mortgage insurance? That’s like Treasury money, yes? But she used it to pay Johnny and Jane their allowances rather than using it to pay the mortgage? Someone’s going to get mad.

If they haven’t already.

August 4, 2009

Corp Fin Deputy Director Shelley Parratt to Speak!

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

We’re very excited to announce that Corp Fin Deputy Director Shelley Parratt has joined our All-Star cast and will serve as the keynote for our “4th Annual Proxy Disclosure Conference.”

Now that Congress is moving on say-on-pay (and other compensation-changing initiatives), you need to register now to attend our popular conferences and get prepared for a wild proxy season. Remember that the “4th Annual Proxy Disclosure Conference” is paired with the “6th Annual Executive Compensation Conference” – so you automatically get to attend both Conferences for the price of one. They will be held November 9-10th in San Francisco and via Live Nationwide Video Webcast. Here is the agenda for the Conferences. Register now.

SEC Settles Charges that BofA Failed to Disclose Merrill Lynch Bonus Payments

As noted in this press release, yesterday, the SEC settled charges that Bank of America misled investors about the bonuses paid to Merrill Lynch executives at the time of its acquisition of the firm. Bank of America agreed to settle the SEC’s charges and pay a penalty of $33 million. Here is the SEC’s complaint – and here is the litigation release.

The SEC alleges that in the joint merger proxy statement, Bank of America stated that Merrill had agreed that it would not pay year-end performance bonuses or other discretionary compensation to its executives prior to the closing of the merger without Bank of America’s consent. In fact, Bank of America had already contractually authorized Merrill to pay up to $5.8 billion in discretionary bonuses to Merrill executives for 2008.

Note that New York Attorney General Cuomo announced that his investigation was continuing – so this saga may not be over…