The Advisors' Blog

This blog features wisdom from respected compensation consultants and lawyers

August 27, 2009

Cool Stuff from Europe: “Wall Street” English and More

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

Back from a record-length vacation (two weeks without email!) and the papers over there are filled with stories about banker bonuses and how the French have gotten their bankers to agree to some restrictions. French President Sarkozy pushed hard for these restrictions and he intends to make it a big point at the upcoming G-20 summit so that French bankers don’t seek employment elsewhere. Here is a WSJ article from yesterday describing these developments.

On a lighter note, I thought I would share a few vaca videos that may interest you:

1. “Wall Street” English

One of my favorite moments in Paris was spotting a billboard on the subway promoting the Wall Street Institute, which promises to teach you how to speak “Wall Street” English and more. Maybe talking the talk in Paris is all it takes to be an i-banker? Here is the billboard:

2. Public Company Offerings in The Hague

While walking down the street in The Hague, I spotted a storefront which had a host of securities law and compliance books – unbelievable, eh? – including one entitled “Prospectus for the Public Offering of Securities in Europe.” See if you can spot it:

3. Dancing Along the Seine River

One of the nicer sights in Paris wasn’t in the guide books. We first spotted it during one of the river boat rides in the Seine – folks of all ages swing dancing along the banks (and many more just eating cheese and drinking wine). The second video below is a closer look as I went in to investigate. Like a storybook come true:

August 26, 2009

Director Pay Falls Slightly

Steven Hall, Steven Hall & Partners

Recently, we wrapped up this study of director pay that found that total remuneration has halted its steady climb, actually falling back by 2.4% over the last year to $245,000 among the Top 200 companies.

In ’03, full-value stock awards represented only about 29% of the total received by directors vs. 41.5% in ’08. The use of options dropped in half – from 63% prevalence in ’03 to 31% in ’08. Cash retainers now comprise almost 29% of the total package. Board meeting fees and stock option awards are far less prevalent director pay elements in ’08 as compared to ’03.

August 24, 2009

When Was “Pay-for-Performance” Born?

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

I’m nearly back from vaca – here is another blog that I tee’d up to be posted in my absence. This one relates to a question that I received from a reporter: “When did the concept of ‘pay-for-performance’ first begin to be used?”

Now this was a hard one to answer with precision since the true answer is the beginning of time. The only reason that anyone would pay anyone else is to receive some form of performance (or in legal terms, in exchange for “consideration.) But the reporter was referring to the movement in the executive pay world where plan design is more sophisticated. And since I am a relative newcomer to this area, I leaned on an old-timer for his input. Here is what I gleaned:

Pay for performance goes much farther back than 1994. Recall that one of the reasons for Section 162(m) was to ensure pay for performance ( and avoid taxpayer subsidies in the event pay was not performance based), so it had been an issue well before then.

So I would say either 1982 (the beginning of the bull market) or 1977 (when Peter Drucker submitted an op-ed to the Wall Street Journal arguing that management pay not exceed 25x’s the pay of the average employee).

Send me your thoughts if you disagree (or agree)…

August 19, 2009

Dynamic Pay Modeling: A Holistic Approach to Execuitve Pay

Julie Hoffman, CompensationStandards.com

With so much going on in the executive pay area, we continue to post numerous memos in all our Practice Areas, including a number of interesting one in our collection of memos about what to do about pay design in a down market. For example, check out this memo by Melissa Means of Pearl Meyer & Partners entitled “Dynamic Pay Modeling – A Holistic Approach to Execuitve Pay.”

August 18, 2009

Options Exchange Programs in Window Periods

Art Meyers, Seyfarth Shaw

This query was recently posted in the Q&A Forum:

“In the wake of the options backdating scandal, companies adopted equity grant policies that typically provide for fixed grant dates that occur during open window periods. In the case of an options exchange program, would you expect that the same considerations should apply to the grant date (i.e., the closing date of the exchange offer) of the new options to be granted? I would expect that it would, as otherwise, a claim could be made that the new options were timed to take advantage of material non-public information.

The second and related question is whether the same considerations should apply to the launch date of the options exchange program when the exchange ratios are set for a value-for-value option exchange. If there was negative news, that news might adversely affect the ratios and participating employees arguably could claim that they were harmed (although the disclosures in the tender offer documents typically state that the valuations could change and the employees would know the news before the expiration date, so that they could withdraw). However, if there was positive news, the participating employees likely would be receiving a greater number of options than they would have received if the exchange ratios had been calculated at the later date. Do you think this is a significant concern such that the SEC might question the timing?”

I responded that I think that exchange programs raise similar backdating issues as option grants, but they are perhaps a bit easier to resolve because the program is publicly-known and there is sufficient lead time to plan. Very few companies have the ability to conduct an exchange without shareholder approval and a tender offer. It seems to me that the shareholder approval process (both the CD&A and the specific proposal) as well as the tender offer provide good opportunities to both communicate the general terms of the timing of the exchange and any necessary modifications to the company’s grant practice policies.

The company will be able to establish the specific exchange period well in advance. It will presumably use the same care for the exchange that it uses in establishing regular grant cycles, or in making off-cycle awards. It ought to be able to plan for an exchange occurring during an open window. Also, the NEOs and directors are usually ineligible to participate in the exchange, thus eliminating a significant class of potentially problematic insiders. Of course, there is the risk that the exchange period may be required to be lengthened or that new material inside information arises (regarding an M&A transaction, for example) during the regrant period.

I believe that many of the timing issues can be dealt with by including within the terms of the tender offer (as most companies do) a right of the company to declare certain electing participants ineligible for the program during or shortly after the window. Presumably the directors, NEOs, company counsel and other compliance personnel ought to be able to reach a consensus at the end of the window whether anyone needs to be declared ineligible. Replacing options with restricted stock or restricted stock units would seem to take off some pressure too. The only blackout period required by law on option regrants would be the BTR rules applicable if a company is changing service providers for its 401(k) plan and has a stock fund that will be closed for more than three days.

August 17, 2009

Executive Pay a Decade Ago

Recently, Directors & Boards re-ran this interesting article that originally appeared in their Summer ’97 issue. Author Harold Geneen was CEO of International Telephone and Telegraph from ’59 til ’77:

Geneen on Executive Pay

You have to ask, “What are corporations paying those megamillions for?” The solemn answer comes back from the board of directors: “Demonstrated capability.” But if the company is doing well, surely the CEO’s predecessors deserve some credit. I propose breaking up Fortune 500 chief executives’ pay, giving one half to the incumbents and splitting the other half among his demonstrably capable predecessors and their heirs.

Absurd? Of course. That’s the point. At the moment, there is no logic in these things. The size of the pay package is dictated by habit. To be sure, most companies will hire consultants to advise them on an “appropriate level” of compensation, but all they do is tote up what everybody else in the industry is making and recommend that their clients pay roughly the same. They are, after all, eager to please their clients’ bosses. As I said, it’s a matter of habit.

This also leads to a steady escalation in the size of compensation packages. Are CEOs worth their paychecks? If so, by what standards? Who sets the standards? Who enforces them? To what extent does dumb luck decide the total?

All good questions — and ones that can’t be answered by outbursts of moral indignation. Once we let our gut reaction to supposed excesses guide our social policy, we will be well on the way to socialism.

Going Beyond Hot Air

I have a suggestion. Why not just use logic? To start off, why not ask: What is excessive? There should be some measure of reasonableness. You have to set some objective standards for measuring worth. Otherwise, all you get is hot air. One critic says, “This is unfair. Who can be worth that much?” And the CEO’s defenders retort, “That’s the price of genius.”

If I had to choose, I would err on the side of paying too much for proven performance. It’s a risk, but it’s a smart risk. However, I would ask a lot of questions: Was the performance really as extraordinary as everybody seems to think? Against what odds did he achieve it? How did the company’s profits and stock price stack up against others in the same industry?

Unfortunately, most boards don’t delve too deeply into the methodology of calculating the true worth of performance. Doing so might ruffle feathers. Much easier to follow the practice of posing two simple questions to the CEO: What did you make last year? And what should your increase be this year?

I’m oversimplifying, of course. Boards deliberate the question of the CEO’s pay with great solemnity. Then, nine times out of 10, they approve a double-digit raise.

‘What Are You Worth?’

Only when a company is desperately seeking a new chief to put its house in order does the question become: What are you worth? Unfortunately, in such a crisis, the rigorous analysis that would make sense in ordinary times becomes irrelevant. All the probing of the candidate’s strengths and weaknesses boils down to a single question: Can he save the company?

If the answer is “no,” he is worth nothing. If the answer is “probably not,” he is worth nothing. If the answer is “maybe,” he is worth nothing. If the answer is “probably,” he is worth nothing. Only if the answer is “yes” is he worth even a penny. But in that case, he is worth pretty much whatever he asks.

While it would be a mistake to assume that the number of prodigies capable of running a big corporation is so small that boards have no choice but to pay them $5 million or more, it would also be a mistake to shrink from paying whatever it costs to get the best. After all, it is the most important investment a company ever makes.

So important, in fact, that the question shouldn’t be: How much does he, or she, cost? The main question is: How do we know he really is the best?

August 13, 2009

Steve Jobs On “The Value of Stock Options”

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

As I’m now on my first lengthy vacation of this decade, I’ve tee’d up a few blogs on matters that I’ve been meaning to blog about – except for new developments got in the way. For example, the TechCrunch blog ran this interesting piece – Steve Jobs On “The Value of Stock Options” – back in April…

August 12, 2009

Survey Results: Corporate Airplane Use by Outside Directors

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

We recently wrapped up our Quick Survey on “Corporate Airplane Use by Outside Directors.” Below are our results:

1. At our company, when it comes to allowing non-employee directors to use the company’s plane to travel to – and from – board meetings:
– Yes, we allow – but we disclose the aggregate incremental costs associated with such use as director perks in the Director Compensation Table – 1.0%
– Yes, we allow – but we believe such travel is for a business purpose and thus do not disclose it in the proxy statement – 60.8%
– Yes, we allow – but we believe such travel is for a business purpose and therefore only disclose that such travel is permitted in the narrative portion of the proxy statement – 12.4%
– Yes, we allow – but only a percentage of the amounts associated with such use is considered for a business purpose – so some of the cost is disclosed in the Director Compensation Table – 0.0%
– No, we don’t allow non-employee directors to fly on the company plane to our board meetings – 7.2%
– No, as a result of a recent change in our travel policy, we no longer allow non-employee directors to fly on the company plane to board meetings – 1.0%
– We don’t have a company plane – 17.5%

Please take a moment to respond anonymously to respond to our “Quick Survey on “Affiliates” for Rule 144 Purposes.”

August 11, 2009

Posted: Summer Issue of Compensation Standards Print Newsletter

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

We just dropped the Summer 2009 issue of the Compensation Standards print newsletter in the mail (remember that as a member of this site, you get the print newsletter as a bonus). Since the issue provides timely analysis of all the regulatory reforms that have recently taken place, we have posted the issue online (use link above) since you may want to read it now and get up-to-speed on the radical changes taking place in the executive pay area.

August 10, 2009

Pay Czar Quietly Meets With Rescued Companies

Broc Romanek, CompensationStandards.com

It is worth reading this Washington Post article from yesterday to get a sense of where the Obama Administration’s pay czar – Ken Feinberg – is heading as he gears up to help set pay at seven companies by this Thursday’s deadline. Below is the text from the article:

President Obama’s compensation czar has been meeting for weeks with executives at some of the country’s largest and most troubled companies as they face a Thursday deadline to propose how much they will pay their top employees. Kenneth R. Feinberg has the unprecedented task of deciding executive compensation at seven companies that received large government bailouts. His meetings with American International Group, Citigroup, Bank of America, General Motors, Chrysler, Chrysler Financial and GMAC have been conducted in secret, with neither Feinberg nor the companies willing to say much in public. But one window into this opaque process is an account provided by people familiar with his discussions with AIG, the crippled insurer that has received tens of billions of dollars in federal rescue money.

Last month, Feinberg’s face flashed across the video screens at corporate offices in London, Paris and Wilton, Conn. Over the better part of an hour, AIG employees on both sides of the Atlantic peppered him with questions about their compensation, recalled several people familiar with the videoconference. What could happen to the bonuses they were promised? Would he try to alter their contracts? How would the company’s pay structure change?

Some of AIG’s highest earners work in these offices, which are home to its financial products division. In March, the division’s employees were paid $165 million in retention bonuses, triggering national outrage. More than $200 million more are scheduled to come due in 2010. After the public uproar this spring, the government brought in Feinberg to help it address — and defuse — one of the most politically sensitive issues it faces.

Feinberg, who has sole discretion to set compensation for the top 25 employees of each of those companies, has 60 days to make a determination after the proposals are complete. Under the administration’s initiative to curb excessive pay practices, each of the seven companies must also receive his approval for how it pays the rest of its 100 most highly compensated executives and employees. The companies must submit pay plans for these employees by Oct. 12.

With Congress and the public already exasperated by the hefty pay awarded to Wall Street bankers, Feinberg is under intense pressure to put checks on excessive pay. But if he goes too far, the companies he oversees could lose their rainmakers and other key executives to rival firms that are not subject to similar pay restrictions.

“I wish I could hum the theme song for ‘Mission: Impossible’ because I think his job is mission impossible,” said Robert Profusek, a lawyer at Jones Day who has advised major banks on compensation matters. “On the one hand, there’s this populist outrage that is fanned every other day by somebody in Washington. . . . But he can’t just go in there with a hatchet and cut everything because the good people will leave. That’s not in our best interest” as taxpayers.

The seven companies are still finalizing the pay plans due Thursday, and several possible approaches are being discussed, say people with knowledge of the deliberations. All seek to give employees an incentive to care about the long-term health of their company instead of short-term gain. They include extending the time that executives must wait before cashing in on restricted stock awards, boosting the proportion of pay that comes in the form of company stock, and adding stronger clawback provisions that allow firms under certain conditions to take back compensation they’ve already paid.

During the videoconference with AIG employees, Feinberg mostly avoided giving them detailed answers to their questions. Many of the employees left frustrated because he gave them no sense of whether he would seek to modify contracts that promise them upcoming bonuses, said people familiar with the session.

Legally, Feinberg cannot prohibit bonuses that were promised before the February passage of the stimulus bill, which included new compensation restrictions for companies receiving government rescue funds. That includes, for example, retention payments to AIG employees. He could try to renegotiate those bonuses if he thinks they’re against the public interest, according to the rules on new compensation.

He could also take these bonuses into account when evaluating an employee’s overall compensation package. For example, if a company proposes giving an executive $1 million in compensation and a $500,000 bonus later this year, Feinberg could subtract the $500,000 from the proposed pay package, in effect negating the bonus.

Even for Feinberg, who oversaw the complex process of paying compensation to victims of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, this latest mission is a delicate balancing act. Senior Treasury Department officials say they do not want Feinberg to set precise prescriptions for how companies compensate employees. Instead, his task is to evaluate pay according to several principles. For instance, does an employee’s compensation reward short-term, risky business behavior? Or, on the contrary, is the compensation tied to longer-term performance goals? Does it allow the company to remain competitive and recruit top talent?

Already, banks such as Goldman Sachs, which recently returned its bailout funds to the government, have set aside enough money that they could resume paying year-end bonuses on the same scale as they did before the financial crisis. That has boosted Citigroup and Bank of America’s argument that they must be free to keep their pay competitive. Further complicating Feinberg’s mission is the assortment of companies under his watch. They include banks, financing firms and automakers, and the industries traditionally pay their executives differently. For each company, he will have to assess the role individual employees play and their ability to generate revenue.

During their discussions, Feinberg has yet to provide executives with a clear sense of how he plans to evaluate their pay proposals. While the pay packages will become public information, the companies have been reluctant to divulge details as they negotiate with Feinberg.

Bank of America said it was “taking the steps necessary to attract and retain key talent and respond to competitive pressures” and that it was looking forward to “working cooperatively with Mr. Feinberg to ensure we comply with all applicable compensation regulations outlined by the Treasury.” Citigroup and AIG declined to comment. Gina Proia, a spokeswoman for GMAC, said the company was “working with the appropriate officials, and obviously attracting and retaining key talent is critical.”

GM spokesman Tom Wilkinson said that traditionally the pay packages at the carmaker “have not been particularly rich.” He added, “We’re very sensitive to trying to make the relationship with the government a mutually beneficial one.” Chrysler Financial, meanwhile, said it was working with Feinberg to “seek advice and input with regard to our compensation plans.” A Chrysler spokeswoman said the company did not want to discuss the package it was putting together for Feinberg.

On Thursday, Feinberg should have seven proposals on his desk, each with its own set of potential land mines. “You’ve got to allow these companies to make the money for the shareholders,” said Linda Rappaport, head of the executive compensation practice at the firm Shearman & Sterling. “And to make the money for the shareholders, they have to have the talent. And to have the talent, they have to be able to pay them competitively.”